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THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION: A THIRD
WORLD PERSPECTIVE
Norman Girvan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of compensation for expropriated 1 property takes
us, in many respects, to the heart of the relationship between the
developed capitalist countries and the Third World. On no other
subject is the gulf between the two-in interests, perspectives and
position--potentially so great, nor so pregnant with passionate and
violent conflict. The rules of international law, the principles of
international economics and the science of international politics can
help clarify the issues involved and provide arguments for the claims
of contending parties. But they cannot yield solutions which are
"neutral" or are free of value judgments and philosophical
assumptions which reflect and affect the interests of contending
parties in different degrees.
The question is one in which realpolitik has always been a
dominant-if not decisive-factor. Current standards of compensation
which are "internationally accepted" derive from concepts of private
property that are peculiar to the capitalist countries of the North
Atlantic. In the light of notions of property characteristic of the
pre-colonial cultures of Asia, Africa and Indo-America, the
philosophical tenets of capitalist attitudes toward private property
appear to be a special case in human society and a relatively recent
phenomenon in human history. That these standards should have
"internationally accepted" status only attests to Euro-American
* Lecturer in economics, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.
B.Sc., London University College of the West Indies, 1962; Ph.D., University of
London, 1966. Advisor on bauxite to the Guyana Government, 1970-71, and
member of the Government's negotiating team for its talks with Alcan Aluminum
Ltd. for a majority interest in the Guyanese bauxite subsidiary.
1. No distinction is drawn in this article among "confiscation," "expropriation" and "nationalization" as distinct methods of divesting foreign interests in
property. "Expropriation" is used throughout the article in its generic sense, ie.
state acquisition of a private foreign property interest for public use. The state
action may either totally or partially deprive the alien owners of title or control.
This usage of "expropriation" is intended to avoid the ambiguous normative
differences that these terms have been used to represent. For an excellent
discussion of these normative distinctions, see S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1953).

hegemony over the rest of the world. A unilateral expropriation,
compensation for which is determined according to the Third World

country's own internal standards rather than those made internationally, runs a high risk of being termed "theft"; and, how far it can be
successfully

accomplished depends on the balance of economic,

political and military forces in the situation.

II.

THE THIRD WORLD'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION

The question of compensation in international economic relations
usually contemplates the case of the expropriation of a foreign
company's assets in a Third World country. The case for the
compensation of the peoples of the Third World is rarely argued. This
is another illustration of the way in which current attitudes reflect the
interests of the nations of the North Atlantic. A cursory examination
of the evidence illustrates my point more lucidly. After World War I
Germany made reparations to the victorious Allies for the destruction
of life and property for which she was held responsible; after World
War II she paid the state of Israel for the Jews who died in Hitler's
concentration camps. Yet Europe has never made reparations to
Africa for the nine million who died on the Middle Passage, nor for
the millions of others who died on the plantations of the New World.2
Moreover, the population of Mexico is said to have fallen from 13
million at the time of the Spanish Conquest to 2 million by the end of
the sixteenth century. 3 Although human lives cannot be valued in
monetary terms, money can be and has been used as partial
compensation for human deaths.
What bolsters the Third World's case for compensation is the
consideration that the destruction of life, transfers of booty and
returns on investments in production and trade guaranteed by military
force, which characterized the European impact on other peoples, can
in large measure be held responsible for the present affluence of the
developed world. West Indian slavery contributed markedly to the
development of European industrial capitalism, 4 as the slave

2. The Rastafarians of Jamaica have for years pointed out that the money
paid as compensation to the Jamaican planters by the British Government when
emancipation of the slaves resulted in the loss of their "property," should really
have been paid to the slaves. Only recently have I come to recognize the
revolutionary significance of this proposition.
3. K. GRIFFIN, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SPANISH AMERICA 46
(1969).
4. E. WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY (1944).
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plantation in the South of the United States contributed to the
economic development in the North and West.' On this issue,
however, we can do no better than to quote the British economist,
John Maynard Keynes:
Indeed, the booty brought back by Drake in the Golden Hind may fairly be
considered the fountain and origin of British Foreign Investment. Elizabeth
paid off out of her proceeds the whole of her foreign debt and invested a
large part of the balance (about £42,000) in the Levant Company; largely
out of the profits of the Levant Company there was formed the East India
Company, the profits of which during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries were the main foundation of England's foreign connections; and
so on. In view of this, the following calculation may amuse the curious. At
the present time (in round figures) our foreign investments probably yield
us about 61/2 percent net after allowing for losses, of which we reinvest
abroad about a half-say 31/ percent. If this is, on average, a fair sample of
what has been going on since 1580, the £42,000 invested by Elizabeth out
of Drake's booty in 1580 would have accumulated by 1930 to
approximately the actual aggregate of our present foreign investments,
namely £4,200,000,000-or,
say, 100,000 times greater than the original
6
investment.
The clear import of Keynes's observations is that the historical
contribution of Third World peoples to the economic development of
the North Atlantic countries has to be compounded over time to be
calculated fully. Certainly a claim like that of James Forman for
$500 million to U.S. blacks7 appears to be extremely magnanimous to
white America. The example of Germany's reparations is instructive
on another point. The African, Asian or American Indian may naively
ask why Europeans and Jews who suffered at Germany's hands
received reparations, and he has not. One answer may be that what is
unacceptable when done to whites is permissable when visited upon
non-white races; but an even more relevant consideration may be
simply that those who wanted Germany to pay were in a position to
force her to do so.

5. See, e.g., W.
(1961).

NORTH,

THE ECONOMIC

GROWTH OF THE UNITED

STATES

6. 2 J. KEYNES,

THE APPLIED THEORY OF MONEY

See also K. GRIFFIN, supra, note 3, at 36.
7. Forman, The Black Manifesto, I

REVIEW

156-57 (1930).

OF BLACK

POLITICAL

ECONOMY 36-44 (1970). It is pointed out that "[t]his total comes to $15 per
nigger" which "is not a large sum of money." Id. at 40.
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Ill. THE COUNTRY-COMPANY CONFLICT

As long as the international balance of power remains unfavorable
to the poor countries, the question of compensation will continue to
be considered in its narrower context. It is, therefore, more
immediately relevant to consider standards of compensation that are
fair and reasonable from the point of view of the expropriating
country. If our consideration is not to be arbitrary, we need to
formulate a set of criteria which will maintain equitable principles of
compensation when applied to particular cases. A criterion which says,
for instance, that the payment terms should not constitute a net
burden on the foreign exchange position of the country will yield one
result when applied to an export industry and a different result when
applied to an industry catering to the domestic market. Therefore, we
need to consider a typology of cases in which the expropriating
situation may arise and to which the criteria of "fairness" should be
applied. To facilitate the development of such a typology,
paradigmatic abstractions representing the two parties in the
dispute-the multinational or parent corporation and the Third World
country-will be used.

A.

The MultinationalCorporation

The abstraction of the multinational corporation embraces the
model structure of the multi-divisional, vertically integrated corporation developed by Chandler (see APPENDIX). 8 What is important for
us is the integrated structure of the firm and the multinational scope
of its operations. The vertical and horizontal integration of the firm's
activities involve segments of the economies of a large number of
different countries within the frontiers of a single decision-making
machinery. The subsidiary or branch in the Third World country is,
therefore, more properly considered an institutional part of the
multinational corporation to which it belongs than a part of the Third
World country itself. This has certain implications for its managerial,
production and financial operations. On the managerial side, the
subsidiary of the multinational corporation is responsible for its
routine operations. But these routine managerial operations take place
within the framework of strategies determined by the central office of
the firm and instructions consistent with these strategies established
by the departmental office to which the subsidiary is responsible. For
8. A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 10-13 (1966). The
appendix is adapted from Chandler's chart at p. 12.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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example, decisions regarding the multinational corporation's overall
rate of production and expansion of capacity are made centrally and
therefore externally to the subsidiary, which means externally to the
Third World country as well. On the production side, operations by
the subsidiary are related to activity in some other sector of the
multinational corporation's operations, on either the input side, the
output side, or both. Thus, a manufacturing plant will buy its raw
materials from a raw materials plant and supply manufactured
components for assembly to another plant, and so on. Much of the
"foreign trade" of the subsidiary in a Third World country, therefore,
will be internal trade for the multinational corporation. Hence, this
trade is totally unresponsive to market forces within the Third World
country. The financial transactions of a subsidiary similarly bear little
resemblance to those of an independent firm. When it "buys" its
inputs from a sister plant and "sells" its output to another sister plant,
bookkeeping entries in the multinational corporation's internal
accounts replace actual cash movements. When cash profits are
actually generated, they are at the disposal of the multinational
corporation's central office. Since dividend, reinvestment and
expansion strategies are determined centrally, in the light of the global
multi-product operations of the multinational corporation, the use of
the surplus generated by the subsidiary's segment of the Third World
country's economy is subject to external control. 9
B.

The Third World Country

The basis of the abstraction of the Third World country is the
isolation of a number of sectors of economic activity in which
subsidiaries of multinational corporations are likely to be operating.
These sectors may be categorized as (1) a plantation-agriculture sector,
(2) a mineral-export sector, (3) a public utilities sector and (4) a
domestic manufacturing sector. There is also, of course, a government
sector responsible for sustaining the level of national income and
generating economic development, full employment and equitable
income distribution, as the national interest demands.
Each sector has certain typical, technical characteristics of
production and occupies a particular place in relation to the national
economy. This relationship conditions the way in which the Third
World government perceives the need to adapt the sector to the needs
of national economic development, i.e. the expropriation motive. At
9. See generally N. Girvan, Multinational Corporations and Dependent

Underdevelopment in Mineral-Export Economies, 19
STUDIEs 490-504 (1970).

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
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the same time, however, the subsidiaries in each sector will also
exhibit certain characteristic forms of integration with their parent
corporations. And, in turn, this relationship conditions the perception
by the multinational corporation of its interests in the conflict with
the Third World government.
1. The Plantation-AgricultureSector.-In this sector large areas of
land are controlled by plantation enterprises, which employ large
masses of relatively unskilled, low-paid labor in the production of a
single crop, such as sugar or coffee, for export to metropolitan
markets. Under these conditions the agricultural sector tends to
exhibit a rigid "export-bias." Adjustments to changes in external
marketing conditions take the form of changes in production levels
rather than changes in the allocation of land and labor to different
export crops or to domestic foodstuffs. The growth of domestic
non-agricultural incomes and the induced growth of domestic food
demand result in rising imports of food rather than growing domestic
production. At the same time, the terms of trade for the plantation
export tend to decline over time, eroding its purchasing power with
respect to imports including imported food. Some of the export
revenue from the crop also leaks abroad both to pay foreign
shareholders' dividends and to pay for imported capital goods and

materials. Because of their desire to be in a position to adjust
production levels at will, the plantations keep substantial excess
supplies of land in reserve; through their monopoly control over land
they also control labor supplies and arrange to keep reserve supplies of
labor as well. Hence underutilization of land and labor is endemic to
the system. As monopsonistic buyers of labor, the plantations are in a
position to keep wages low. Consequently, the mass of rural incomes
are maintained at a subsistence level, choking the growth of the
domestic market for products of manufacturing industry.' °
The objective of the Third World government in this case is likely to
be one, or both, of the following two broad alternatives. The first is to
increase production of the plantation crop to secure the additional
foreign exchange required for the development effort; the second is to
adopt a more flexible system of resource use to service domestic
demands for food and agricultural materials for industrial processing,
thereby cutting back production of the plantation crop and perhaps
initiating the production of new exports. In both cases there will be
the desire to increase employment and incomes, especially in the rural
areas, by bringing idle land and labor into production, and to nationalize the profits from agricultural production to secure them

10. See generally G.
(1971).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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for use by the national economy in general and the government in
particular. Cuban policy after the Revolution exhibited both
objectives at different times: the first in 1959 and after 1963; the
second from 1960 to 1963.
For the multinational corporation, the plantation represents a part
of its raw material base for a worldwide system which includes
transport and facilities ancillary to transport (such as storage),
refining, manufacturing of the end product, manufacturing of inputs
(such as machinery and transport equipment), and marketing. An

expropriation that seeks to maintain or increase the level of plantation
production, and to retain the transport, refining and marketing links
with the multinational corporation will obviously be less adverse to
the firm than one that seeks either to shift exports to different
markets and generate new external connections or to shift entirely to
different export crops and domestic food.
2. The Mineral-Export Sector.-This sector produces strategic
mineral resources (petroleum, bauxite, iron ore) for transport,
refining, etc., in metropolitan countries by other branches of the
multinational corporation, as in the plantation case. Here, however,
production is typically capital-intensive. Thus large amounts of profits
and depreciation funds are generated by the industry while little labor
is employed. To the government, therefore, this sector represents a
crucial source of finance for the development effort-a source that is
even more valuable because it is being realized in the form of foreign
exchange. Additionally, mineral resources are frequently strategic
inputs for industrialization. Accordingly, the government may
naturally wish to use whatever natural resources the nation has as the
basis for an industrial development effort. At this juncture the conflict
with the interests of the multinational corporation is likely to be the
sharpest because the firm itself has a global production system based
on the use of the mineral resource. In other words, the national
economy and the corporate economy represent directly competing
interests for the use of the resource as an industrial input."
3. The Public Utilities Sector.-Activities such as electric power,
railways and communications have a different significance for both
the Third World country and the multinational corporation. In this
case, the output of the industry already forms a strategic input into
the national economy. Thus the industry's price structure, growth rate
11. The Caribbean bauxite industry illustrates this point. See N.
THE CARIBBEAN

BAUXITE

INDUSTRY

GIRVAN,

(1967). An application of the

expropriative motive in this situation can be found in Girvan, Why fl'e Need to
Nationalize Bauxites and How, READINGS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE CARIBBEAN (N. Girvan & 0. Jefferson eds. 1971).
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and direction of expansion are of vital importance to both the rate
and the direction of the development of the national economy.
Moreover, the nature of this sector's activities are frequently such that
the public utility companies have de jure or de facto monopoly status.
This situation has two immediate implications. First, the particular
company concerned has overt or latent powers of monopoly pricing;
and secondly, the company concerned represents to the government
the only means of securing the desired commodity or service at the
price level and expansion rate deemed necessary for national
development.
To the multinational corporation, the operation of a subsidiary in
the public utilities sector of a Third World country's economy
represents a source of cash profits since the output is sold on the local
market to outside customers. Furthermore, the subsidiary is a captive
customer for the sale of manufactured equipment and "technical
services" of one kind or another from plants in other countries. Such
"sales" by the multinational corporation to its own subsidiary can give
rise to as much profit as the profit actually generated by the
subsidiary itself. Thus, the attitude of the multinational corporation
toward the expropriation will depend on the way in which the
expropriation affects these two interests.
4. The Domestic Manufacturing Sector.-Manufacturing activities
that produce a commodity such as steel, refined petroleum products,
chemicals or other strategic inputs for industry can be classified as
"public utility" activities for the purposes of this discussion. Similar
considerations apply to these manufacturing activities as to the public
utility case. However, those industries engaged in the production of

items that may be classified as nonessential in the production
structure, such as consumer durables, are subject to slightly different
considerations. The production of such items is likely to use
components and technology imported from the parent corporations,
and is geared to satisfy demands from the more privileged groups in
the society. Historically, such industries have not been important as
targets of expropriatory action by Third World governments, nor have
they been a major source of company-country conflicts. The potential
interest of Third World governments in such industries would arise
from more general, comprehensive policies of national planning for
resource allocation, including the allocation of foreign exchange.
Hence, expropriation in these cases is normally associated only with
full-fledged socialist regimes,
in which social ownership and
comprehensive central planning is a matter of ideological principle. 12
12. An example of the kind of problem that can arise in this situation is
provided in the following statement by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, made while he
Vol. 5-No. 2
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The potential interest of Third World governments in these industries
might arise from a desire to utilize their surpluses, and their foreign

exchange payments to parent corporations for inputs and technology,
for purposes deemed to have higher benefits in terms of national
economic priorities.
The interest of the parent corporation in its subsidiary, in this case,
is in maintaining the subsidiary (1) as a source of cash profits, (2) as a
captive customer for the components, technology and "services"
provided by other plants, and (3) as a means of controlling and
enlarging its share of the global market for the end product. The exact
nature of the expropriation, of course, will affect each of these
interests in some particular way.
There is a tendency on the part of academic and other
commentators from the North Atlantic to regard acts of expropriation
by Third World governments as unfortunate and uninformed
aberrations of government conduct. The words "rash," "irrational,"
"xenophobid," and "senseless" are often used to conjure up an image
of a lunatic who runs amok and destroys the very source of his
livelihood. The frequent implication is that therapy, in the form of
sound economic advice from foreign experts, is necessary. Moreover,
economic development textbooks are written to include discussions
demonstrating the value of foreign capital to the development process
of Third World countries, and expensive projects are mounted to show
the ways in which the interests of multinational corporations and
those of Third World governments may be harmonized.
Hopefully, the brief discussion in this section has helped to show
that conflict between the multinational corporation and the Third
World government is to a .large extent structurally inherent in the

relationship, 13

arising from the divergence of the structure and

was Minister of Industry in Cuba: "Coca-Cola was one of the most popular drinks
in Cuba, but today it tastes like cough syrup. It has seven, eight, or nine--I don't
remember how many-ingredients, some of which are secret. This was one of
those secrets held by American factories: ingredients arrive with the label 'xz-29'
and all the Cuban technician has to know is that he must put a certain amount
into the mechanism in which the components are mixed, and out comes the
ordinary Coca-Cola with the taste we all know. It was necessary to do much
investigation and a substitute has been found, but sometimes we have to eliminate
an ingredient that we can't get and can't make." E. BOORSTEIN, THE
ECONoMIc TRANSFORMATION OF CUBA 104 (1968).

13. Extended discussions of such structural conflict can be found in G.
BECKFORD,

supra note 10; R. MIKESELL,

FOREIGN INVESTOR-HOST

COUNTRY RELATIONS (1971); Girvan, supra note 9. Mikesell's book contains a
mine of information on petroleum and other resource industries and is
characterized by its emphasis on the harmonization of country-company conflicts.
Spring, 1972
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perspectives of the multinational corporation from those of the
national economy. Hymer suggests:
Multinational corporations are private institutions which organize one or a
few industries across many countries. Its polar opposite4 is a public
institution which organizes many industries across one region.'
Consequently, acts of expropriation must be seen as attempts to
resolve structural conflicts by transferring ownership of natural
resources and other assets from one party to the other through the
assertion of the principle of national sovereignty. Such acts usually
have an economic rationale which derives from the needs of economic
development and the material improvement of people in Third World
countries. The motives are not only to capture surpluses generated
through the use of the nation's natural resources and through
monopoly market situations, but also to secure control so that the
industry in question can be organized effectively to support policies of
full employment, income growth and industrialization. Except for
cases in which expropriations take place because of attachment to

socialist or communist principles, such acts usually occur after periods
of dispute and attempts at negotiated settlement. This period can last
for decades and go through many phases.'" Moreover, expropriation
occurs only after the government in question has taken the psychological step of assuming responsibility for production and marketing,
with confidence in its capabilities and in those of the nation. In this
sense, expropriation must be viewed as an act of maturity rather than
one of childishness.
IV.

THE COMPENSATION QUESTION

The "fair" amount and method of compensation from the point of
view of the Third World government should be evaluated in the
context of the industry concerned and the specific motive for the
government take-over. In addition, the elements of compensation
arrangements are many and varied, and their total effect must be
accounted for in assessing their financial significance. Finally,
compensation arrangements can contain features other than those
associated with financial payments. These features must also be taken
into account in evaluating the significance of various alternative
arrangements.
14. Hymer, Multi-National Corporations and Uneven Development, EcONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER

(J. Bhagwati ed. 1970).

15. See the many articles in B. MIKESELL, supra note 13; N. GIRVAN,
COPPER IN CHILE: A STUDY IN CONFLICT BETWEEN CORPORATE AND
NATIONAL ECONOMY (1972).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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A. FinancialAspects
The financial aspect of compensation traditionally has been
discussed in terms of the method of valuing the assets and the
promptness of payment. While these elements are undoubtedly key
aspects of the question, they are not exclusive, and other factors can
have an equally important influence on the total effect. A more
complete listing would include the following elements:
(a) the method of valuing the assets;
(b) the speed, currency and interest-rate adopted for deferred
payments;
(c) the fiscal regulation applying on any remaining equity interest
of the parent corporation and the corporation's net earnings
therefrom; and,
(d) other earnings by the parent corporation from the new
enterprise resulting from the "sale" of services such as
marketing and management.

1. Valuation.-A fairly large number of alternative valuation
methods exist, but the ones most likely to be used as the basis for
contending positions are the capitalized market value, the replacement
value, the depreciated book value, and the sales value of real assets.
The capitalized market value is based on the expected profitability of
the operation as a going concern, with an appropriate time discount
factor. The formula used will be a price-earnings ratio or some variant
of it. Usually, some figure agreed upon as the normal or expected
annual net profits of the operation will be multiplied by an agreed
factor in computing the market value. In this method there is an
implicit view of the government as an investor making a take-over bid
for the business on a mythical stock exchange. 1" This method was
used in the "Chileanization" agreements between the Frei Administration in Chile and the United States copper companies. 7
The principal problem with this method lies not with the practical
difficulties of making reality conform to the myth, but rather with the
16. An actual take-over bid is usually prohibited by the fact that subsidiaries
in Third World countries are usually wholly-owned by their parent multinational
corporations and their stock is not traded.
17. See R. SAEZ, CHILE Y EL COBRE: PERSPECTIVAS DE UNA NUEVA
POLITICA (1965) for the method used to value the 51% of Kennecott's
subsidiary acquired in 1964. CORPORACI6N DEL COBRE, AGREED NATIONALIZATION (1969) discusses the formula which was to have been used for the
acquisition of the remaining 49% of Anaconda's subsidiary (the first 51% was
acquired at book value).
Spring, 1972
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validity of using the profits of the enterprise as a basis for valuation.
In natural resource industries, a portion of the profits can be ascribed
to the use of and control over the natural resource itself, and not
merely returns on invested capital. In other words, they contain an
element of what economists call "economic rent" or "quasi-rent." In
most Third World countries, especially former colonies, the argument
can be made that because formal ownership of the minerals is vested
in the state, the economic rent should be excluded from the valuation.
Similar valuation problems can arise both in the plantation-agriculture
case, in which part of the profit is due to monopoly control of land,
and in the public utilities case, in which part of the profit is due to
monopoly status in the market.
A much more intractable problem in using profits as a valuation basis
is that the amount of net profits of the business itself is subject to
government influence to a large degree. Merely by raising its tax rate
by a certain amount, the government can, for example, halve the

annual net profits of the operation and thereby halve the "market"
value. Government power to regulate prices can also be used to the
same end in the public utilities case. Therefore, the capitalized market
value method has a frail foundation when the buying party can
unilaterially, and arbitrarily, change the factors which determine the
value itself.
The basis of the replacement value method is the amount that it
would or will cost the firm to replace the fixed assets it has lost as a
result of the expropriation. This method, therefore, may be relied
upon to produce a result which is generally favorable to the parent
corporation. Like the capitalized market value method, it involves the
implicit principle that the firm should suffer as little as possible
financially-and, if possible, not at all-as a result of expropriation.
Third World governments are more likely to favor a method such as
the depreciated book value used for income tax purposes. This
method was proposed by the Guyana Government for its participation
in the bauxite producing subsidiary of the Alcan aluminum company."3 The calculation of the amount of due compensation by this
method is based on the actual historical cost of the assets involved less
the amounts historically deducted and written off against income tax
for depreciation. This amount will be much lower than the replace18. See Address by Hon. L.F.S. Burnham, S.C., Prime Minister of Guyana,
Control of Our Natural Resources: Address to the Nation, February, 1971. This
method was also used by the Zambian Government for the acquisition of its 51%
share in its copper mines. It seems likely that a number of oil-producing countries
may propose similar schemes to begin participation in the petroleum companies.
See 3 OPEC WEEKLY BULL. No. 5, REVIEW OF THE PESO 11 (1972).
Vol. 5-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

ment cost since the current cost of capital goods is higher than in the
past, and since the capital is purchased at market prices before
deduction of depreciation. Moreover, the equity of this method is
supported by the fact that it utilizes the value officially and formally
recorded by the multinational corporation in its books for purposes of
its prior dealings with government authorities. The government can
reasonably argue that the firm cannot legitimately use one valuation
for the purposes of tax payments, and then seek to use another (much
higher) valuation for purposes of compensation. The practical advantage of this method over the capitalized market value method or the
replacement cost method is that it allows for little dispute over the
exact figure that should be used.
A fourth method of valuation is based on an estimate of what the

parent corporation would actually realize if it were to sell the physical
assets concerned. The use of this method is almost certain to result in
the lowest possible valuation. Machinery and equipment will have, at
best, second-hand value on the market, and, at worst, scrap value.
Lands owned by plantations are usually very large in relation to local
land supplies; therefore, placing this land on the market will steeply
depress the price. Land containing mineral deposits cannot be mined
without government permission, and mining leases cannot be sold by
one lessee to another. Thus, ownership of the surface area becomes
worthless once government permission to use the resources of the
subsoil has been withdrawn. An equivalent situation holds for public
utility companies operating as legal monopolies. Essentially, this
"sale" value of the real assets amounts in large part to a forced-sale
value in which the party who is acquiring the assets-the government-is not only identical with the party who is forcing the sale but
also the party who can virtually dictate its own terms.
Obviously this method will arouse the bitterest opposition from the
companies because it gives rise to the lowest possible valuation and
involves the most drastic violation of the norms associated with the
sanctity of private property. Yet it must be pointed out that this
method is the logical result of the application of the principle of
national sovereignty and the right of the sovereign nation to
nationalize. A decision to nationalize is, in effect, a decision to impose
a forced sale. Once the validity of the sovereign right to nationalize is
recognized, the properties of a forced sale may be attached realistically to the act of nationalization itself. To put it another way, a
forced-sale value is no more unfair to the company than the
capitalized market value is unfair to the government. Both methods
involve the application of norms which attach to either one of the
parties: the one, the sovereignty of the nation; the other, the sanctity
of private property. If we speak of the standard of compensation for
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Third World governments, then, we speak of the forced-sale value;
anything more amounts to a concession involving the relaxation of the
sovereignty principle.
2. Speed, Time-Distribution and Currency of Payment.-Multinational corporations and the governments of capital-exporting countries
tend to emphasize the "promptness" of payment as basic to fair
compensation arrangements. The ideal against which all other arrange-

ments are measured is immediate payment in the form of convertible
currency. Such a standard strikes at the very heart of the motive for
which expropriation is undertaken by the Third World government.
Because the expropriation motive reflects the need to nationalize the
surplus and foreign exchange generated by the subsidiary for national
use, immediate payment in cash will be either financially impossible
or, if financially possible, inconsistent with the purpose of the
expropriation. The payment would deplete not only the cash
resources of the government but also, and more importantly, the
nation's foreign exchange reserves. Third World governments normally
suffer from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange; it is, in fact, one
of the characteristics of underdevelopment itself. It is difficult enough
to make cash payments in the form of domestic currency. Possible
means include government borrowing from the central bank, borrowing on the local capital market from private investors, and increases in
taxation. When the cash is in the form of foreign exchange, the
method adopted would have to provide means for facilitating the
availability of the resources in the latter form. This will necessitate
recourse to such measures as cutting imports, trying to expand
exports, borrowing internationally, and running down existing exchange reserves, all of which impose severe additional burdens on an
underdeveloped economy. Indeed, as our previous discussion has
shown, it is precisely because of such strains that a Third World
government resorts to expropriation in the first case.
The standards adopted for Third World governments, therefore, will
be based broadly on the principle of ability to pay. In practice this
means that some form of deferred payment must be used and that the

arrangement will relate both the amount and the form of payment to
the position of the enterprise after nationalization. In other words, the
annual payment of principal and interest must be low enough to
permit the expected net after-tax profit of the enterprise to cover it
and leave something for the enterprise or the government to use.1 9
Moreover, whether payments are made in convertible currency will
19. This was also used in the case of Guyanese bauxite. See Girvan, The
Guyana-Alcan Conflict and the Nationalization of Demba, 5 NEw WORLD

Q., No. 4 (1971).
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depend on the expected ability of the new enterprise to generate
foreign exchange.
The dimensions of the problem can be appreciated more fully by
the following example. Suppose that the net profits of an expropriated
company normally amount to approximately fifteen per cent of the
agreed value of assets. Paying a theoretical commercial interest rate of
seven per cent would leave an annual flow amounting to eight per cent

of assets. Thus, if all of the profits are used for amortization and
interest payments, it will take roughly eight years to pay off the debt
with nothing left behind for the government to use for other purposes.
More realistically, a Third World government works with the following
arithmetic. Using two-thirds of the net profit of the nationalized
enterprise for developmental purposes would leave behind a flow
amounting to five per cent of the value of assets for debt servicing. If
this residual amount is used entirely for amortization it will take
twenty years to pay for the assets on an interest-free basis; if interest
is paid, it will take even longer. If the agreed value of the assets is
lower, then it will take a shorter time to pay, but only because the
principal involved is smaller.
Such calculations assume that the enterprise--after nationalization-will continue to earn the level of profits it earned prior to
nationalization. There are, however, many possible circumstances that
render any model founded upon such an assumption of little more
than academic value. Suppose, for example, in the case of an export
industry, that the multinational corporation and its home government
boycott sales of the nationalized enterprise. Or suppose that whatever
the industry, the flow of components and spare parts is cut off. Profit
levels may then decline during a period of dislocation while markets,
production and supply sources are reorganized. Such a period may
endure for years. Would it then be reasonable for the Third World
government to agree on compensation terms that assume profit levels
that are themselves disrupted by the aggressive actions of the
multinational corporation and its home government? The answer can
bnly be no. The Third World government is put in an impossible
position: the multinational corporation and its home government
concede the right to expropriate in principle, but insist on "prompt
and adequate" compensation, which is impossible in practice. To put
pressure on the Third World government, the multinational corporation and its home government impose economic sanctions, which
make it difficult for the Third World government to provide for any
compensation at all. This is then used as further evidence of the Third
World government's "unreasonableness."
The result is that deferred payment arrangements by the Third
World government must be based not only on "ability to pay" but
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also-to be realistic-must be made contingent on the maintenance of
"good behavior" on the part of the multinational corporation and its
government in those areas which affect the enterprise's ability to pay.
For all industries this means doing nothing to interfere with the
normal flow of materials, components and spares to the nationalized
enterprise. For export industries it means, in addition, doing nothing
to disrupt the maintenance of the normal export markets of the
enterprise. In the context of the vertically integrated multinational
corporation this means the maintenance, for a transitional period, at
the minimum, of at least some of the transport, processing, supplying
and marketing links between the new enterprise and its former parent.
A further complication arises in applying the "ability to pay"
principle to industries catering to the domestic market when part of
the expropriation motive is to reduce the price of output in order to
service the rest of the economy. This could be the case for public
utilities, industries producing basic industrial inputs, and consumer
goods industries producing items for mass consumption. Expropriation may take place here in order to reduce the profit rate. In such a
case the validity of this motive must be recognized in evaluating the
enterprise's ability to pay.
We can now apply these considerations broadly to the main types
of industries found in the Third World country. In plantation-agriculture, the main form of capital is land. Since this asset is non-transportable, its price is subject to internal factors and the government is in
the strongest position to impose a forced-sale value. Since this
industry is also labor-intensive, the share of profits in output is likely
to be relatively low. This requires an extended period of deferred
payment, which may be shortened to the extent that the agreed value
of assets is lowered, and to the extent that the new enterprise is able
to improve profits by raising production and prices. Both the amount
of payment and the payment's international convertibility will be

partly contingent on the maintenance of normalcy in the external
relationships of the enterprise. This would permit arrangements which
might include delivery of the output of the nationalized enterprise to
the multinational corporation as part of the payment flow, a device
which both permits payment to be made in kind and resolves part of
the marketing problem for the Third World government, as well as
part of the raw material supply problem for the multinational
corporation.
In mineral-export industries, production is usually capital-intensive.
Since machinery and equipment is more amenable to international
pricing, there is a higher floor to the forced-sale value, but since
profits form a high share of the value of output, ability to pay is
generally favorable. Furthermore, since the distribution of mineral
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resources between countries is skewed, and because time is needed to
discover new deposits and bring them into production, mineral-exports are more amenable to oligopolistic pricing by producer nations,
as witness the case of petroleum and copper. Hence, payment periods
can be relatively short, and convertibility relatively easy to guarantee.
Chile paid for the 51 per cent of Kennecott it acquired under the
1964 agreement in two years in U.S. dollars largely as a result of
bonanza prices for copper. Zambia is compensating expropriated
interests over a period of eight years by six per cent bonds which are
guaranteed convertible into U.S. dollars. In slight contrast, Guyana
proposed to acquire its share of the bauxite industry by paying out of
the future profits of the new company, and in the finl negotiated
nationalization agreement, payment is to be made over a period of
twenty years at an effective interest-rate of four and one-half per cent.
This reflects a lower ability to pay, due to the lack of a "free" market
in bauxite and alumina, the currently depressed state of the aluminum
industry, and the lack of oligopolistic pricing by bauxite producing
countries.

In both domestic manufacturing and public utilities, production is
likely to be more capital-intensive than in plantation-agriculture and
less so than in mineral exports. The general level of the forced-sale
value will occupy a corresponding position. However, since a favorable
ability to pay in this case implies a price structure that is considered
too high in the context of the national economy, it may well have to
be revised downward. This implies a fairly long period of deferred
payment. Since the industries cater to the home market, they do not
directly generate foreign exchange and, hence, the convertibility of
payments cannot normally be guaranteed. The multinational corporation, in other words, experiences a degree of exchange risk that is no
greater and no smaller than the risk it experienced as the full owner of
the subsidiary when it realized surplus in the form of domestic
currency.
3. Fiscal Regulations Applying to any Remaining Equity Interest
of the Multinational Corporationand Its Earnings from such Equity
Interest.-When the government acquires only a controlling intereste.g., 51 per cent-of the multinational corporation's subsidiary, the
parent retains ownership of an equity interest in the operation. In
such cases the parent may seek to negotiate the sale of various services
to the new mixed company, such as management, marketing, technical
services and purchasing. In such cases, therefore, the net financial
effect of nationalization-in reality, partial nationalization-is a result
not only of the compensation arrangements for the majority share
acquired by the Third World government, but also of the financial
characteristics of the arrangements governing the multinational corSpring, 1972
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poration's minority interests and its sales of services to the new
company.
In some outstanding recent cases-Chile in 1964, Zambia in 1969,
and Guyana in 1971-multinational corporations sought fiscal concessions on their minority interest as the price of their agreement to the
government's acquisition of a majority interest. Among the concessions sought were drastic tax cuts-or exemptions from taxes
altogether-and freedom from exchange control and other restrictions.
Such concessions may be given by the Third World government to
secure an agreement by the multinational corporation to undertake
expansion of the enterprise using government money or funds
provided by third parties. The objective of such an agreement is to
insure that the total of compensation payments and earnings from the
multinational corporation's minority equity are not only maintained
but also increased relative to its previous earnings as full owner of its
former subsidiary."
When tax rates are reduced, the Third World
government, in effect, is induced to accept dividends on its equity
interest (for which it is obliged to pay) partly in lieu of tax receipts,
for which of course it does not pay and to which it is entitled as of
right. When expansion is to be undertaken, the Third World
government must either put up money itself, or secure the funds from
international financial institutions under government guarantee. Such

arrangements, therefore, while having the appearance of harmonizing
the interests of the Third World governments and the multinational
corporations, will probably be approached with growing caution by
Third World governments in the future.2 1
The provision of a variety of services to the new company also
represents an important form of earnings to the multinational
corporation, since payment for these is usually put on a percentageof-gross-revenue basis. Under such conditions the receipts of the
multinational corporation for such service do not bear a direct
relationship to the actual value of the services provided. On the other
hand, as managing and marketing agent on a commission basis, the
multinational corporation does have an incentive to maximize
production, sales and prices. Yet the multinational corporation's
incentive to maximize profits through minimizing costs may be
weaker, as its only interest in so doing would be to maximize the
return on its equity interest.
20. See Semonin, Nationalization and Management in Zambia, 5 NEw
WORLD Q., No. 3, at 1 (1971); K. GRIFFIN, supra note 3, at ch. 6; N. GIRVAa,

supra note 15.
21. It was as a result of such caution that the Guyana-Alcan negotiations
broke down.
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The value of such arrangements to the multinational corporations,
however, goes beyond its financial implications. These arrangements
offer means by which the parent corporation may retain various kinds
of control over an enterprise that is nominally controlled by the Third
World government. Such arrangements thus have the advantage for the
multinational corporation of conceding the form of government
control without the substance. The arrangements are also made to
appear advantageous to the Third World government by securing the
parent corporation's provision of a variety of skills without which,
theoretically, the goals of the expropriatory action cannot be attained.
Ideally, these governments should be in a position to retain only those
links that are absolutely essential for the maintenance of production
and profits, and only for as long as they are necessary. Multinational
corporations tend to argue that if they are to provide the external
links that minimize the risks inherent in deferred payment arrangements, the links must be provided in forms that are sufficiently
comprehensive and long-term to retain control for the multinational
corporation.
The overall result is that multinational corporations are often
willing to concede majority holdings to the government, and to
provide external links to the new enterprise, only on terms that are at
variance with both the financial and the control motives of the Third
World government. As with the standards of compensation for full

expropriation, the inherent structural differences between the perspectives of the two parties tend to be very wide.

V.

CONCLUSION

The considerations we have been discussing are summarized in
schematic form in TABLE 1. As shown in the tabular presentation,
the various aspects of compensation arrangements are outlined in the
rows of the table, with the alternatives ranked in the order of their
degree of advantage to the Third World government. The four main
types of industry selected for this analysis are placed in the columns.
The table is filled in by a general assessment of the extent to which
any compensation feature corresponds to the interests of the Third
World government as the expropriating party. The most advantageous
arrangement for the Third World government is labelled "preferable."
Beyond this, however, some slight differences in the positions of
different industries emerge. Of the industries distinguished, mineralexports are likely to be the most financially capable for the purposes
of compensation. Public utilities and domestic manufacturing may be
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TABLE 1

Plantation- MineralAgriculture Export

Public
Utility

Domestic
Manufacturing

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Improbable

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Improbable

Preferable
Improbable

Preferable
Possible
Improbable

Preferable
Probable
Possible

Preferable
Possible
Improbable

Preferable
Improbable
Improbable

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Possible

Preferable
Improbable

Preferable
Improbable

Greater
Same as before

Preferable
Probable

Preferable
Probable

Preferable
Probable

Preferable
Probable

Lower

Improbable

Improbable Improbable

Improbable

Preferable

Preferable

Preferable

Preferable

Improbable

Improbable

Improbable

Improbable

Valuation
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Forced-sale value
Depreciated book value
Replacement cost
Capitalized market value

Timing of Payment
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

Long-term
Short-term
Immediate

Interest-Rate
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

Zero
Nominal
Commercial

Currency of Payment
(i)
(ii)

National
Convertible

Fiscaland Exchange Burden
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

Provision of Services
(i)

(ii)

Selective, at Third World
gov't discretion, at
"market" value
Total, long-term, on
percentage basis

the least capable because of the sensitivity of the remainder of the
economy to their price structure. Moreover, they are less capable of
paying in convertible currency than are plantation-agriculture and
mineral-exports. In all cases, the concessions sought by the multinational corporations, concerning fiscal and exchange burden and
provision of services, are not likely to be consistent with the motives
for which Third World governments seek full or part nationalization.
This analysis has endeavored to reveal a number of points to bear in
mind in evaluating compensation arrangements from the viewpoint of
Third World governments that carry out expropriations. First,
Vol. 5-No. 2

VANDERBIL T JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

countries whose peoples have been the victims of centuries of
decimation, plunder and exploitation are bound to approach the
question of compensating foreign interests with a great deal of
cynicism. That they contemplate compensation at all may be only in
deference to international realpolitik. Secondly, the economic motives
for expropriation imply certain specific financial and control aspects
of the compensation arrangements that are consistent with such
motives. These will vary from industry to industry, but as a general
rule they will differ profoundly from what is considered "fair" by the
multinational corporations. Thirdly, this profound difference stems
from the wide divergencies in structure, perspectives, objectives and,
ultimately, philosophy between the Third World countries and the
multinational corporations in the developed countries. Finally, those
whose stated ideal is the promotion of the development of Third
World economies and the material betterment of their people may
find even they have to choose between their stated ideals and their
financial interests, which most probably coincide with those of the
multinational corporations.
APPENDIX
ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMMODITY FLOWS FOR THE
VERTICALLY INTEGRATED, UNI-DIVISIONAL FIRMS
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